The 'prohibition' against semantic evidence has been based largely on the fact that the nature of the form-meaning interface is one of the most difficult problems in linguistics. The worst thing, therefore, would be to presuppose that such evidence is relevant to syntactic theory. Also, by avoiding semantic evidence, one can use form to get at meaning: 'In general, as syntactic description becomes deeper, what appear to be semantic questions fall increasingly within its scope... ' (Chomsky 1964: 936) . For example, Chomsky (1957) motivated the passive transformation purely on its formal properties. The rough paraphrase relation between actives and passives was not one of Chomsky's motivations. Hence, Chomsky felt comfortable concluding that his analysis explained why actives and passives are largely synonymous. And later (Chomsky 1973), a constrained theory of movement rules led to the Specified Subject Condition and Tensed-S Condition, which led to the trace theory of movement rules, which led to surface interpretation of meaning, which led to capturing certain aspects of quantifier scope structurally (May 1977) .
In the past 20 years, however, the methodological corollary to AS has been increasingly violated. Routinely now, projections (NegP, TopP, FocP, AspP, etc.) are proposed purely on evidence deriving from the meanings or discourse properties of the items involved. Likewise scope differences and differences in event interpretations drive the proposed hierarchical orderings among these projections. The remainder of the talk is devoted to demonstrating the negative consequences of using semantic evidence within syntactic theory.
I begin with English modal auxiliaries. The structural generalizations have been known for many years:
(1) a. They occur before all other auxiliaries (must have gone; *have must gone) b. They do not occur in sequence (in Standard English) (*might could) c. They take neither infinitive marker nor inflection (*to would; *woulded) d. They must be followed by non-finite form of the verb or auxiliary (*I must had gone) e. They invert in questions and are followed by the negative morpheme. f. (1a-e) apply equally to root and epistemic modals.
Much current work (Stowell 2004 ; Zagona forthcoming-a; b) ignores (1a-f). The goal has become to represent the subtle scopal differences between root and epistemic modals structurally. As I demonstrate, the downside is that (1a-f) become next to impossible to capture.
I turn next to English derived nominalizations (DNs) (refusal, height, aggression, etc.) . It has been known since Chomsky (1970) b. *Harry's certainty to win the prize (no Raising within DP)
These profound formal generalizations are all but ignored in a lot of current work. Instead, the goal has become to capture subtle event reading generalizations struc turally (see Borer 2003 , Alexiadou 2001 . (4b) I show that the generalizations represented in (2-3) are next to impossible to capture if a VP node underlies the DN destruction.
I turn then to a critique of the (crosslinguistic) projection NegP, which is typically posited using exclusively semantic evidence. As I show, negation can pattern struc turally with complement-taking verbs (Tongan); with auxiliaries (Estonian); with derivational affixes (Turkish); with nouns (Evenki); and with adverbs (English). If all negative elements are heads of the NegP projection, then these language-particu lar patterns are unaccounted for.
I conclude with a brief discussion of why semantic evidence has become increasingly used by syntacticians. I suggest that it is due in large part to the fact that there has never been a formal semantic theory that has meshed comfortably with mainstream generative syntax. The tendency then has been to expand syntax to encompass what is naturally the domain of semantic theory or of interface conditions linking syntax and semantics.
